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Why Animals have an Interest in Freedom 
Andreas T. Schmidt ∗ 
Abstract: »Warum Tiere ein Interesse an Freiheit haben«. Do non-human ani-
mals have an interest in sociopolitical freedom? Cochrane has recently taken up 
this important yet largely neglected question. He argues that animal freedom is 
not a relevant moral concern in itself, because animals have a merely instru-
mental but not an intrinsic interest in freedom (Cochrane 2009a, 2012). This 
paper will argue that even if animals have a merely instrumental interest in 
freedom, animal freedom should nonetheless be an important goal for our rela-
tionships with animals. Drawing on recent work on the value of freedom, it will 
be argued that freedom is non-specifically instrumentally valuable. According-
ly, freedom is a means to other goods, but often it is not possible to identify 
those goods in advance or aim for them directly. Some of the reasons that 
make freedom non-specifically valuable for human relationships, it will be ar-
gued, also apply to relationships between humans and animals. Amongst other 
implications, it will be shown how this argument provides a response to those 
who fear that stricter animal protection policies might undermine people’s 
freedom: A concern for freedom actually requires stricter protection policies 
rather than speak against them. 
Keywords: Freedom, liberty, animal rights, animal ethics, abolitionism, liberalism. 
1.  Introduction1 
Should animals be free? Alasdair Cochrane has recently taken up this important 
yet underresearched question and argued that while animals do have moral rights, 
a right to be free is not one of them (Cochrane 2009a, 2012). Cochrane thinks that 
animals have no intrinsic interest in freedom and that, therefore, freedom is not a 
value that should guide our relationships with animals. In this paper, I will argue 
that animal freedom does matter, even if freedom is not intrinsically valuable for 
animals. A critique of Cochrane’s negative argument will serve as a backdrop for 
the new, positive proposal defended here. 
                                                             
∗  Andreas T. Schmidt, University Center for Human Values and Woodrow Wilson School of 
Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 354 Wallace Hall, Princeton NJ 08544, 
USA; andreas.schmidt@princeton.edu. 
1  I would like to thank Svenja Ahlhaus, Peter Niesen, and an anonymous reviewer of Histori-
cal Social Research for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I should also 
thank Alasdair Cochrane for helpful discussions on ideas covered in this paper. 
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I also hope to show that connecting discussions about animal politics with re-
cent work on the nature and value of socio-political freedom will help sharpen the 
debate on animal liberation. Specifically, a concern for animal freedom – as I will 
argue – cuts across some standard distinctions in animal ethics and politics. To 
tell a highly simplified story of the different sides in debates on animal ethics, we 
could distinguish between ‘welfarists’ and ‘abolitionists.’ Welfarists believe that 
human relationships with animals should be such that everyone’s well-being is 
given equal consideration independent of their respective species-membership 
(Singer 1975). Welfarists typically also believe that instead of abolishing all uses 
of animals, we need stronger legal regulation to prevent that animals suffer in 
these practices. Abolitionists disagree. They – along with other animal rights 
theorists – hold that the use of animals is never morally permissible and our 
duties towards animals are negative: Animal liberation requires that we leave 
animals alone (Regan 1983, 357; Dunayer 2004, 117-9; Francione 2005, 132).2 
One might try to characterise this disagreement, and this is the line taken by 
Cochrane, as (amongst other things) a disagreement about whether animals 
should be free. Welfarists believe that animals have an interest in welfare but not 
freedom. Therefore, our duties towards animals do not include a duty to leave 
animals alone. Abolitionists, on the other hand, aim for animal liberation in the 
sense of giving animals freedom. I will take a different line and argue that while 
we do have moral reasons to be concerned with animal freedom, this does not 
commit us to the abolitionist position.  
I will proceed as follows: To set the stage for my own argument, I will first 
outline Cochrane’s argument against animal freedom (section 2) and distin-
guish between different concepts of freedom (section 3). In section 4, I will 
argue that even if freedom is only instrumentally valuable, it is a social ideal 
that has non-specific value. The reasons that make freedom non-specifically 
instrumentally valuable for humans in social contexts also apply to animals. 
Therefore, we have moral reason to be concerned with animal freedom. In 
section 5, I will discuss some of the implications of this argument for debates 
on animal politics.  
                                                             
2  This characterisation is, as said above, in many ways simplified. For example, some prefer 
non-consequentialist views of animal ethics but still hold that our duties towards animals 
can be discharged through better regulation without abolishing all human uses of animals 
(Cochrane 2012). Conversely, some authors believe that animals should have personhood 
rights without believing that we need to abandon all interactions with animals (Donaldson 
and Kymlicka 2011, 3-10). See Francione and Garner (2010) for an example of the debate 
between regulationists and abolitionists and (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011) for a charac-
terisation of the debate between welfarists and, what they call, animal rights theorists. Also 
see (Sunstein and Nussbaum 2005) for a number of views on animal political theory that 
resist easy categorisation. 
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2.  Cochrane’s Argument against Animal Freedom  
Let us start with Alasdair Cochrane’s argument to the effect that animals do not 
have a right to be free – the best and most detailed argument for that claim to 
date. He argues as follows: For someone to have a moral right to x (e.g. free-
dom), one needs to have a sufficient intrinsic interest in x. This is a tenet asso-
ciated with the so-called interest theory of rights. But not any old interest 
counts in this context. To have an intrinsic interest in the relevant sense, x 
needs to be relevant for one’s wellbeing, for how well one’s life goes. 
Cochrane then argues that humans do have an intrinsic interest in freedom.3 He 
uses the example of Truman Burbank in the film The Truman Show. Truman 
leads a pleasurable yet unfree life. Because of his unfreedom, or so Cochrane 
argues, we would not consider Truman’s life a good life. The Truman example 
seems to suggest that our interest in being free is not merely instrumental, it is 
freedom itself that determines, amongst other things, how well our lives go 
(Cochrane 2009a, 664). The reason for this is that humans are autonomous 
agents who are able to frame, revise and pursue their own conceptions of the 
good. In a next step, Cochrane then argues that this is not the case for animals:  
Fish, frogs, rats and cats may all have the capacity for conscious experience 
and may also possess desires, but there is little in their physiology or behav-
iour to suggest that they have the ability to reflect on their own thoughts and 
pursue their own considered goals. I think then that we are on reasonably safe 
ground when we say that the vast majority of sentient animals are not autono-
mous agents (Cochrane 2009a, 668). 
According to Cochrane, animals are not autonomous agents. Therefore, free-
dom does not by itself contribute to animal welfare.4 Accordingly, animals do 
not have an intrinsic interest in being free and thus no moral right to be free. To 
summarise, the argument runs as follows:  
P1: To have a moral right to freedom, one needs to have a sufficient intrinsic 
interest in freedom.  
P2: To have a sufficient and intrinsic interest in freedom implies that freedom 
by itself contributes to a person’s wellbeing.  
P3: Only in case of autonomous persons does freedom contribute by itself to 
their wellbeing (because only for autonomous persons does unfreedom un-
                                                             
3  Cochrane mainly uses the term ‘liberty,’ whereas I will use the term ‘freedom.’ Jonathan 
Wolff provides a conceptual analysis of a distinction between the two (Wolff 1997). Howev-
er, because this distinction has not caught on in the literature, I take ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ 
to be interchangeable.  
4  Cochrane remains somewhat agnostic about whether some non-human animals, such as 
great apes, might have the capacity for autonomy. He therefore suggests a precautionary 
principle in these cases (Cochrane 2009a, 667-8).  
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dermine the ability to ‘frame and pursue their own conception of the good’ 
(Cochrane 2009a, 666)).  
P4: Non-human animals are not autonomous persons.  
C1: Therefore, freedom does not by itself contribute to the wellbeing of non-
human animals.  
C2: Therefore, non-human animals do not have an intrinsic interest in free-
dom.  
C3: Therefore, non-human animals do not have a moral right to freedom.  
Note, however, that Cochrane holds that animals do have an instrumental inter-
est in freedom. Being unfree usually, though not necessarily, comes with other 
bad things. Typically, lacking freedom implies being worse off in many ways 
such as being bored, being exposed to physical and psychological suffering and 
so on. We can improve an animal’s situation in this context by tackling the 
causes of its suffering directly. This is possible without making that animal 
free. So, in cases in which animals are better off with more freedom, this rela-
tionship between freedom and wellbeing is merely contingent and not a result 
of animals having an intrinsic interest in freedom (Cochrane 2009a, 674).  
Cochrane intends for this conclusion to invalidate the abolitionist position. 
Abolitionists like Francione argue that any use of animals for human purposes 
is impermissible. Therefore, our duties towards animals are negative and re-
quire the abolition of all human uses of animals (Francione and Garner 2010; 
Francione 2010, 2013). Cochrane disagrees. There are ways in which humans 
can permissibly use animals as long as we respect their rights not to suffer and 
not to be killed.5 This does not stop Cochrane from being opposed to most 
current uses of animals. He does hold that we need to abandon most forms of 
animal experimentation, farming animals for food, keeping animals in circuses 
and so on (Cochrane 2012).  
3.  Different Concepts of Freedom 
In the next section, I will argue against Cochrane’s position and show that 
animal freedom should play an important role as a normative ideal to structure 
our relationships with animals. Before doing so, let us be clearer about what we 
mean by ‘freedom.’ Excluding the metaphysical notion of ‘freedom of the 
will,’ let us distinguish the following three concepts of freedom.  
First, theories of psychological freedom typically try to answer questions like: 
Under what conditions are a person’s preferences autonomous? Under which 
conditions does a person act according to her ‘real self’ (Berlin 1969)? Psycho-
                                                             
5  Garner objects to Cochrane’s argument that a right not to suffer would by itself already go 
a long way towards the abolitionist position (Garner 2011).  
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logical freedom is, what Charles Taylor has called, an exercise-concept (Taylor 
1979). 
Second, freedom can be understood as an opportunity-concept (Taylor 
1979). Freedom on this reading is not about a person’s psychological states. It 
is about her range of opportunities. Within this type of theory, we can broadly 
distinguish two classes. Some theories hold that one is free, if and only if one is 
free from external interpersonal restraints (Steiner 1974, 1994; Carter 1999; 
Berlin 1969). An ability to do something is not a necessary component of free-
dom. Of course, there is great variety within this class of theories, because 
there is disagreement about what differentiates constraints on freedom from 
those that merely make one unable but not unfree (Miller 1983; Kristjánsson 
1996; Shnayderman 2013; Steiner 1994; Carter 1999, chap. 8). Other theories – 
such as Amartya Sen’s capability approach – hold that freedom requires more 
than being free from external constraints. Instead, freedom requires being actu-
ally able to do things, which in turn requires having relevant external resources 
as well as being free from external and internal constraints (Sen 1988, 1991, 
1999; Parijs 1997; Kramer 2003).6  
Lastly, ‘freedom’ can also refer to the social and legal status of a person (Pettit 
2003, 2007). Being a free person on this reading is not the same as being free in 
the psychological sense, nor is it the same as having a certain range of opportuni-
ties. Instead, it means having a social status with respect to others and having 
those freedoms respected that one is owed. An obvious example of a theory of 
status freedom is republicanism. What matters for republicans like Pettit is not the 
range of a person’s options as such. Instead, being a free person means not being 
subjected to other people’s arbitrary power with respect to one’s basic liberties 
(Pettit 1997, 2012, 2014).7 Another person’s capacity to arbitrarily interfere with 
my life makes me unfree even if that person never exercises her capacity. 
                                                             
6  Kramer’s view is a mix of the two views, because he equates specific freedom with ability 
but does not equate inability with unfreedom. Only if one is subject to interpersonally im-
posed constraints – in Kramer’s case constraints that have been caused by another human 
being – is one unfree rather than merely unable to do something (Kramer 2003, chap. 4).  
7  Pettit himself identifies his own theory as being about freedom in the status sense (Pettit 
2003, 2007). I think the category of ‘status freedom’ might plausibly include other views of 
socio-political freedom. Though somewhat contentious, I think Rawls’ theory of freedom 
also falls into this category. Rawls defends an inherently relational account of freedom ac-
cording to which a person is free only if she has access to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic liberties (such that one’s freedoms are compatible with the same scheme of liberties 
for all others). According to Rawls, “[f]reedom is a certain pattern of social forms” (Rawls 
1971, 63). Larmore argues that Rawls’ conception of freedom bears much more resemblance 
to Pettit’s republican theory than one might think and is not adequately categorised as a 
purely Berlin-style theory of ‘negative’ freedom (Larmore 2003). Moreover, I think that lib-
ertarian views of freedom – rather than being theories of freedom as an opportunity-
concept – also fit more naturally into the status freedom group. For they are inherently 
moralised and relational theories of freedom and thus best described as being about a cer-
tain social status, i.e. having the status as a bearer of moral and legal rights (Nozick 1974).  
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Here, I will not discuss how far psychological freedom and status freedom 
apply to non-human animals. I argue elsewhere that the reasons humans have 
for valuing these notions as political values do not apply to non-human animals 
(Schmidt 2015). There I argue that freedom as an opportunity-concept is the only 
notion that plausibly applies to non-human animals. In this paper, in contrast, I 
will argue that freedom as an opportunity-concept is a value that should apply to 
non-human animals without saying anything about the other concepts of freedom. 
But it is worth pointing out that some of the reasons we have for being sceptical 
about ‘animal freedom’ apply more to psychological freedom and status freedom 
and much less so to freedom as an opportunity-concept. Why should animals care 
about their status? Should they care about other people’s power to interfere with 
their lives even if such power is never exercised? Also, should we be concerned 
with whether a dog acts according to its authentic or ‘real self’? These are inter-
esting questions that suggest it is difficult to move from human freedom to 
animal freedom.8 But these difficulties pertain much more to psychological and 
status freedom and much less so to freedom as an opportunity-concept. The 
latter seems to apply quite naturally to human and non-human animals. When 
we think about animal freedom, we might think of a free bird or a lion running 
around freely in the wild. Saying that animals can be free in this sense is not 
meant metaphorically (Smith 2012, 51-2; Taylor 2011, 109). It seems a perfect-
ly natural way to talk about animals having more or less freedom in the oppor-
tunity-sense.9 However, that it is natural to talk about animal freedom in the 
opportunity-sense does not imply that animals have an interest in freedom in 
this sense. I will now argue in which sense freedom in the opportunity-sense is 
indeed valuable for non-human animals.  
4.  The Value of Animal Freedom: A Defence  
Remember one of Cochrane’s conclusions:  
C2: Non-human animals do not have an intrinsic interest in being free.  
From this, Cochrane concluded that animals do not have a right to be free. But 
I will now argue that freedom should be an important value in shaping our rela-
                                                             
8  Paul Taylor suggests a different version of animal ‘positive’ freedom, such that animals 
ought to be free to live according to their natural functionings and biological ends. 
Cochrane presents some strong objections to this view. See (Taylor 2011, 108; Cochrane 
2009a, 672).  
9  I will remain neutral about which of the two aforementioned classes of theories of oppor-
tunity-freedom – freedom as non-interference vs. freedom as ability – we should apply. I 
find the latter independently more plausible and think it is also the adequate framework to 
think about animal freedom. However, the argument in this paper does not depend on this 
question.  
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tionships with animals, even if we lack an argument to the effect that animal 
freedom is intrinsically valuable. The central disagreement between Cochrane’s 
and my view concerns this proposition:  
Elimination: if animal freedom is only instrumentally valuable – that is, as a 
means to other valuable ends – but not intrinsically valuable, then we can 
achieve these good ends directly without being concerned with animal free-
dom at all.  
If Cochrane is right about Elimination and C2, we would have to conclude that 
freedom is not a normative ideal that should guide our relationships with non-
human animals. I will show that Elimination is false. I will not argue against 
C2, that is, I will remain neutral regarding the question as to whether animal 
freedom is or is not intrinsically valuable. Instead, I will argue, first, that free-
dom has non-specific value and, second, is a social ideal. This being so, even if 
freedom is merely instrumentally valuable, we cannot directly achieve (all of) 
the good things to which freedom is a means. The conditional – i.e. Elimination 
– is false. Again, this is meant not merely as a criticism of Cochrane’s position 
but also as a positive argument to guide our efforts in the theory and practice of 
animal ethics and politics. 
One caveat before I start: I will not argue for the stronger position that ani-
mals have a moral right to be free (nor am I arguing against it). This might be 
surprising given that Cochrane presents his arguments as being about a right to 
be free. The reason I do not talk about moral rights is that I do not think all 
relevant moral reasons we have with respect to animals are covered by rights. 
So, methodologically, I think it is preferable to start with a list of all moral 
reasons that apply to animals and then, in a next step, discuss which ones of 
these are so central as to be covered by a right. I will here only take the first 
step in such an argument. This will also allow us to be neutral about some 
fundamental questions in moral theory. The argument I make in this paper is 
thus in principle available to both non-consequentialists and consequentialists.  
4.1  Freedom’s Non-Specific Value  
Ian Carter distinguishes between freedom’s specific and non-specific value: 
A phenomenon, x, has non-specific value (is valuable as such) if the value of x 
cannot be described wholly in terms of a good brought about or contributed to 
by a specific instance of x or set of specific instances of x (Carter 1999, 35).  
Freedom can of course be specifically instrumentally valuable (Hees 2010). For 
example, having a specific choice-set at a specific time might make a person very 
happy, because she loves the best option of the choice-set. But for freedom to be 
non-specifically valuable, something different needs to be the case. Consider:  
a situation in which one person has ten feasible career options, including those 
of becoming a teacher, lawyer, politician, or accountant, and in which another 
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person only has the choice of becoming a teacher or doing nothing. And imagine 
that both of them prefer teaching to any other occupation (Carter 1999, 42).  
If freedom has non-specific instrumental value in this situation, then the choice-
set {teacher, lawyer, politician, accountant, …, doing nothing} should be more 
valuable than the choice-set {teacher, doing nothing} even if ‘teacher’ turns out 
to be the best option. In general, freedom is non-specifically valuable only if its 
value is not reducible to the good brought about by specific instances of it. 
The problem with Elimination is that it assumes that animal freedom has 
merely specific instrumental value. If animal freedom has non-specific instru-
mental value, we cannot eliminate freedom as one of our goals and, therefore, 
Elimination would be false. I will now supply a few arguments to the effect 
that freedom does indeed have non-specific instrumental value for humans (I 
do not mean for this list to be comprehensive). Below in section 4.3, I will then 
return to animal freedom and show that these reasons to value freedom non-
specifically in the human case apply to animals too.   
First, what people desire and what they enjoy changes over time. Having 
freedom in the opportunity-sense ensures that options are available beyond 
those that one is enjoying at the moment. While you might be perfectly content 
with the options you have now, your preferences and likings might change 
drastically over time. Having the freedom to choose increases the probability 
that one will be content or get what one will want in the future (Carter 1999, 
45). The importance of personality change for freedom is easily underestimat-
ed. While we typically acknowledge that we changed drastically in the past, we 
falsely tend to think that the way we currently are is how we will be for the rest 
of our lives. In a recent psychology study, this phenomenon has been dubbed 
the ‘end of history illusion’ (Quoidbach, Gilbert and Wilson 2013). So, even if 
we think freedom is only instrumentally valuable in making other goods possi-
ble in the future, we very often do not yet know what these other goods are. Let 
us call this reason to value freedom the Changing Personality Reason.  
Second, often we do not know what we want or what might be good for us. 
Freedom ensures that we have enough to choose from when we do not exactly 
know what it is we want. Even more important, when we influence how much 
choice other people have, we often do not know what they want or enjoy. Hav-
ing more freedom rather than less will often lead to better outcomes given our 
limited knowledge about ourselves and other people (Carter 1999, 45). Let us 
call this the Epistemic Reason.  
Third, another reason for valuing freedom is personal control. We can un-
derstand personal control, roughly, as the ability to be in control over one’s 
surroundings, particularly being able to change adverse circumstances. Person-
al control is not only relevant in the sense that one actually has external oppor-
tunities to exercise control, it is also important to perceive oneself as being in 
control. The opposite of personal control is helplessness, that is, having a sense 
that one is helpless in the face of adverse circumstances. Helplessness is often 
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causally related to depression, so the advantages of its opposite, personal control, 
should be immediately apparent (Peterson and Seligman 1984; Seligman 1992). 
Freedom comes into the picture, because agents can develop attitudes of help-
lessness – learned helplessness – if they have been in situations in which they 
lacked adequate control over sources of stress in their surroundings (Seligman 
and Maier 1967). Let us call this the Personal Control Reason.  
The reasons surveyed so far support the view that freedom is non-
specifically valuable without assuming that freedom has intrinsic value and 
without assuming any specific theory of the good life. To show that Elimina-
tion is false, I will below argue that these reasons to value freedom non-
specifically do in fact apply also to animals. 
4.2  Freedom as a Social Ideal  
There is a second, and related, consideration that speaks against Elimination. 
Freedom is not merely a private value but also, what I will call, a social ideal. 
What I mean by this is that freedom is not merely a goal that we set ourselves – 
as a private goal – but also functions as an important goal for the way we set up 
our social, legal, political and economic relations (I will continue referring to 
these as ‘social relations’). Consider a situation in which you can decide 
whether you will have choice-set A or choice-set B in ten seconds’ time. A only 
contains option a, your favourite option. Choice-set B contains a as well as 
further, mutually exclusive options b, c and d. Is there any reason why you 
should not be indifferent between the two choice-sets A and B given that you 
are sure you just want a? Absent any preferences over choice-situations, it is 
indeed hard to find a good instrumental reason for you to value freedom non-
specifically in this case. However, one should be wary of moving from such 
individual, one-off choices to freedom in social contexts. We should distin-
guish two questions: First, do I have reason to non-specifically value a larger 
choice-set in a one-off choice in which I know exactly what my preferences 
over the different options are? Second, is there reason – in the sense of adding 
non-specific value – to provide people with more rather than less choice as part 
of the way we set up our social relations? Even if the answer to the former 
question is negative, there is very good reason why the answer to the second 
question is in the affirmative. Such ‘social contexts’ differ from a one-off indi-
vidual choice in at least three respects.  
First, instead of the person choosing between choice-sets for herself, it is of-
ten someone else who decides which choice-set a person should have in social 
contexts. For example, consider the question as to whether it is permissible to 
keep horses in stables. Clearly, someone takes that decision for the horses rather 
than the horses for themselves. Above I mentioned the Epistemic Reason to 
value freedom non-specifically: Freedom is important as an ideal to structure our 
relationships with others, because, amongst other things, we often simply do not 
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know what others want or what is good for them. It is clear that freedom as a 
social ideal has great non-specific value: If we often choose what options other 
people should have, we have good reason to allow them to have greater choice-
sets, because we are uncertain about what they prefer or what is good for them.  
Second, the social and institutional contexts under consideration here are 
usually not one-off situations but repeated and rule-governed interactions. Most 
social interactions involve rules in one way or another. One feature of these 
rules is that they usually extend temporally into the future. Including freedom 
as one of the ideals shaping our social relationships means that the rules and 
terms of our interactions will provide people with a greater rather than a small-
er range of opportunity now and in the future. This intertemporal dimension of 
freedom as a social ideal connects naturally with the Changing Personality 
Reason. Persons change over time. I do not perfectly know what I will be like 
in the future much less do I know what you will be like in the future. This gives 
us reason to value more choice over less across time.  
Finally, the rules underlying our social and institutional contexts usually do 
not apply to merely one person. For example, when we discuss whether we 
should grant individuals the freedom to wear the clothes they want, we are not 
interested exclusively in the question as to whether some specific individual 
should have that freedom or not. Most social rules carry some level of generali-
ty. This aspect of the social context links up with the Epistemic Reason again: 
People require different things at different times to lead a good life. Given 
interpersonal differences in preferences and requirements for a good life, we 
simply lack the knowledge and ability to provide everyone with exactly the 
options they require to lead a good life. Therefore, we have good reason to give 
people more rather than less freedom.  
The two considerations put together give us the following conclusion. Even 
if freedom is only instrumentally valuable as a means to other goods, we cannot 
aim for these other goods directly. Freedom has non-specific value particularly 
in its role as a social ideal. Therefore, freedom cannot be eliminated and should 
be one of the social ideals shaping our social, inter-human relations.  
4.3  Animal Freedom 
To show that Elimination is false, let us now apply the two considerations 
above specifically to animal freedom.  
The question I am concerned with is whether animal freedom is valuable as 
a social ideal. Again, this is different from asking whether it is valuable for a 
specific animal to have freedom in a specific instance at a specific time. When 
we are interested in human-animal relationships, we are interested in relation-
ships that, first, extend across time and are not simply one-off interactions, 
second, usually apply to a multitude of animals rather than one specific animal 
and in which, third, humans influence how much freedom animals have (rather 
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than animals determining this for themselves). I shall now discuss how far the 
three reasons that made freedom non-specifically valuable for humans apply to 
animals too. In this discussion, it will become clear why animal freedom is 
particularly valuable, if it is understood as a social ideal.  
The first reason – the Changing Personality Reason – applies to animals too. 
We might think, for example, that piglets have different desires and needs than 
fully grown pigs. What an animal wants or needs to lead a good life can and 
will change across time. Admittedly, this reason might be somewhat less 
weighty for animals than for humans. So, the other two reasons carry most of 
the weight in making animal freedom non-specifically valuable.10 
Second, the Epistemic Reason clearly applies to animals. In fact, it might 
even be stronger for human-non-human relationships than for inter-human 
relationships. Knowing what animals enjoy and want is usually more difficult 
than knowing what humans want or need, because we cannot ask them. Given 
that humans and animals do not share a language, one often has to rely on 
educated guesswork (though such guesswork can of course be improved 
through empirical studies and first-hand experience). So, our epistemic con-
straints with respect to animals give us a very strong reason to value the free-
dom of animals (even more so than in the human case). Here, the role of animal 
freedom as a social ideal is particularly clear. In theory, it might be the case 
that a specific animal needs very little choice to lead a perfectly happy life and 
might thus lack good instrumental reason to strongly prefer larger choice-sets. 
However, when we are confronted with influencing the choices of animals – 
that is, their choices – our best bet is usually to give them more rather than less 
freedom.11 Moreover, when considering whether freedom should shape our 
relationships with animals, we should remember that even animals of the same 
species might have very different needs and preferences. For example, a specif-
ic domestic cat might not value the freedom to leave the house very highly and 
prefer to spend all its days inside. However, this in no way justifies keeping all 
domestic cats locked inside houses without the option to leave.  
Third, the Personal Control Reason is relevant for both human and non-
human animals. Learned helplessness is not an exclusively human phenomenon. 
In fact, many studies on the subject are done with non-human animals. For 
                                                             
10  The ideal content and size of a choice-set will vary between species of course. An eagle will 
require more freedom than a cow, for example. We should therefore also expect the corre-
sponding difference between the optimal choice-set for younger and older members of 
these respective species to vary. 
11  It is often held that freedom restrictions are typically not problematic in the human case, if 
they have been incurred voluntarily. If a human voluntarily restricts her own choice-set by 
entering a monastery, for example, this might not be a problem from the perspective of 
freedom. An additional problem with restricting animal freedom is that we cannot straight-
forwardly apply this idea of voluntary freedom restrictions. For it is much more difficult to 
maintain in individual instances that an animal voluntarily agrees to specific restrictions.  
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example, in a classic study, Martin Seligman and Steve Maier showed how 
exposing dogs to uncontrolled stressors can alter their future behaviour and 
lead to learned helplessness (Seligman and Maier 1967). To show this, they 
subjected dogs to electric shocks. One group of dogs were in a position to end 
those shocks for both groups by pressing a panel. Though both groups of dogs 
were subjected to the same shocks, those dogs that could end these shocks for 
both groups of dogs – those that had control over the stressor – recovered 
quickly from such experiences. Those dogs that had no control over the stressor 
later showed signs of learned helplessness. It is important to distinguish two 
aspects in this case. Subjecting animals to stress will be bad in directly lower-
ing animal welfare at the time. But subjection to uncontrolled stressors can also 
have longer-term effects on animal behaviour in later situations very different 
from the one in which stress was first administered (so-called ‘trans-
situationality’) (Maier and Watkins 2005).  
Reflecting upon personal control also gives us additional reasons to err on 
the side of caution when restricting animal freedom. Remember Cochrane’s 
argument against animal freedom was that animals lack the necessary higher-
order capacities to be autonomous. Being made unfree by human interference 
will not per se lower their well-being. This is different for humans: Because 
(most) humans are autonomous and understand and care about the social con-
texts within which their freedom can be restricted, unfreedom lowers human 
well-being in ways that it does not for animals. Note, however, that this consid-
eration can also be invoked, conversely, to argue that we should be particularly 
careful about restricting animal freedom. Because animals lack certain cogni-
tive capacities to understand the nature of some social interactions, animal 
unfreedom might sometimes be particularly (and non-specifically) harmful to 
animals. Restrictions of one’s freedom might be experienced as more stressful 
and as a greater loss of control by animals than humans, when they do not 
understand their purpose and context. For example, while we understand the 
necessity of sometimes undergoing uncomfortable medical procedures or of 
travelling in very restrictive conditions in public transport, animals will per-
ceive such situations very differently. Animals are often not cognizant of the 
purpose behind them nor is there usually a way in which they meaningfully 
consent to such procedures. As Andrew Linzey writes:  
Consider the case of wild animals, for example, non-human primates who are 
captured, taken from the wild, and then subjected to captivity in zoos and la-
boratories. The animals concerned do not know why they have been captured, 
why they are being transported, and what will happen to them. They experi-
ence the raw terror of not knowing. And since the implication of the argu-
ments is that animals live closer to their bodily senses than we do, the frustra-
tion of their natural freedoms may well induce more suffering than we allow. 
Human suffering, on the other hand, can be softened by an intellectual com-
prehension of the circumstance [...] No such consolations are available to an-
imals who are denied their liberty (Linzey 2009, 17). 
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I conclude that we have very good reason to uphold animal freedom as a non-
specifically valuable social ideal. To make the rather abstract ideas somewhat 
more palpable and to offer a positive example of how freedom can be integrat-
ed in our relationships with companion animals, consider the case of Tommy. 
During my exchange semester as a student in Santiago de Chile I lived on a 
street that was also home to a dog named ‘Tommy.’ Tommy had a family that 
provided him with food but, unlike most other dogs, he was not their dog. 
Though he stayed in their house more often than not, he only did so when he 
chose to. Tommy would spend a significant portion of his day walking up and 
down the street barking at cars that drove by. On some days, he would meet me 
at the top of the street when I came back from university and escort me to my 
house. Tommy was also friends with other dogs that lived on the street. He 
would also spend time with other neighbours, often popping round our house 
for company, for example. I think the social relationships between Tommy and 
the humans that lived on this street provided him with comparatively better 
conditions for a good life than those had by companion dogs that lack Tom-
my’s level of freedom. Tommy’s interactions with most humans seemed volun-
tary as he was not dependent on them for food or shelter. Tommy could interact 
with people and other dogs when he chose to and had the freedom to roam 
around ‘his street’ if he so wished. I believe Tommy’s comparatively high level 
of freedom and the control he had over where and how to spend his days were 
non-specifically valuable for him.  
The suggestion is of course not that the example of Tommy can be easily 
extrapolated to all animals. Our relationships with animals differ strongly be-
tween species and different species will value some freedoms more highly than 
others. Human animals clearly need different types of freedom than non-human 
animals, so it should come as no surprise that there will be differences between 
non-human species too.12 Also, the suggestion is not that animal freedom’s 
non-specific value implies that it is always best all things considered to maxim-
ise an animal’s freedom. First, sometimes freedom needs to be traded off with 
other goods, such as happiness or a sense of security (more on this below). 
Second, that freedom is non-specifically valuable does not imply that its ex-
pected marginal contribution in terms of value is always constant. Accordingly, 
increasing an animal’s freedom when it has very little freedom might some-
                                                             
12  One might object that this would require using evaluative weighting factors for determining 
the freedom of different species and that this would be incompatible with seeing freedom as 
an opportunity-concept. However, while some theorists do believe that we can measure free-
dom without invoking any evaluative considerations (Steiner 1974, 1994; Carter 1999), most 
theorists of opportunity-freedom believe that we need to invoke evaluative considerations in 
our conceptualisations of freedom (Sen 1988, 1991; Pattanaik and Xu 1998; Kramer 2003; 
Sugden 2003). If we accept the latter view, we can say that an animal’s freedom depends on 
species-specific needs. Moreover, Kramer also convincingly argues that invoking evaluative 
considerations does not undermine freedom’s non-specific value (Kramer 2003, chap. 5.2).  
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times expectably improve its life more than increasing its freedom by the ‘same 
amount’ when it already is very free.13  
5.  (Practical) Conclusions 
Cochrane’s argument that animal freedom does not matter, because animals do 
not have an intrinsic interest in freedom, was shown to be false. I have re-
mained neutral with regard to the question as to whether animal freedom is 
intrinsically valuable or not. My line of argument has been that even if animals 
only have an instrumental interest in freedom, freedom’s non-specific instru-
mental value for animals and it being characteristically a social ideal make it 
an important ideal to shape our relationships with non-human animals.  
Note again that I have argued that freedom is an important but not the only 
ideal that should morally guide us in how we interact with animals. I have merely 
argued for a presumption of animal freedom. For example, if alleviating suffering 
might require restricting an animal’s freedom, then this might often be something 
we ought morally to do. I have here not attempted to outline a comprehensive 
moral and political theory of animals nor have I argued that animals have a right 
to freedom that trumps all other moral considerations. Despite the limitations of 
this argument, let me nonetheless mention some of its implications.  
First, remember that I invoked a specific concept of freedom, i.e. freedom as 
an opportunity-concept. This notion of freedom means that this argument re-
sists straightforward categorisation into one of the ‘standard views’ in animal 
ethics. The argument is compatible with a consequentialist approach that fo-
cuses on animal wellbeing (Singer 1975). But unlike approaches in which 
animal welfare is understood very narrowly – for example as the absence of 
obvious forms of suffering – the argument here holds that freedom is necessary 
for animal welfare in a more expansive sense, because of freedom’s non-
specific value. This would require quite drastic changes to the way we interact 
with non-human animals and go much further than the currently scanty provi-
sions to protect animal welfare. Above all, it would admonish us to be much 
more cautious in restricting animal freedoms, because we simply lack the 
knowledge to ensure that animals lead a good life in very restricted settings. 
Conversely, thinking that animal freedom matters non-specifically does not 
commit us to the abolitionist conclusion either. We can care about animal 
freedom in the opportunity-sense without abolishing all forms of interactions 
with and uses of animals. We can often respect animal freedom without ‘leav-
ing them alone.’ In the case of Tommy, we saw that we can take animal free-
                                                             
13  See (Dworkin 1988, chap. 5) for a critical philosophical and (Schwartz 2009) for a psycho-
logical discussion of whether it is better to have more rather than less choice. See (Carter 
1999, 43, 61-3) for a good response to Dworkin.  
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dom seriously whilst also having ongoing and involved relationships with 
companion animals. A concern for animal freedom would imply, however, that 
we need to greatly reshape or even abandon many of our current forms of inter-
acting with animals. Intensive factory farming is the obvious example. But also 
keeping horses in stables, using greyhounds for dog races or animals in cir-
cuses are restrictions of animal freedom that should be abandoned in light of 
their strong specific and non-specific disvalue.14  
Second, the argument provided here also does not rule out interfering with 
the lives of animals in their natural habitat to make them better off (‘policing 
nature’ as it sometimes called). It is sometimes argued that wild animals living 
in their natural habitat often lead stressful, and usually very short, lives in very 
harsh surroundings. If humans are in a position to improve those conditions, 
there is good moral reason, at least in principle, to do so (Cowen 2003; Horta 
2012). As I said above, if one cares about animal freedom, there will always be 
a presumption against interference. But this presumption does not make inter-
ference per se impermissible. If such interference greatly improves the condi-
tions of animals, or if it allows them to lead a life with more freedom, then the 
presumption against interference can be overridden. Of course, whether one 
will have sufficient moral reason to do so depends on empirical questions about 
the efficacy of such interventions. Quite often, such interventions might make 
matters worse rather than better. I am not qualified to assess these empirical 
issues here. My point is merely that while animal freedom in the opportunity-
sense raises the stakes for the justification of such interventions, it does not 
make them impermissible as such.  
Third, that we have moral reason to care about animal freedom gives us ad-
ditional resources to defend stronger Animal Protection Policies (APPs). Ad-
mittedly, given all the other moral reasons against our current forms of animal 
exploitation – such as animal suffering for example – it seems the case for 
much stricter APPs is strong enough already. However, as an exercise in non-
ideal theory, invoking animal freedom gives us a good reply to objections often 
voiced in actual political discourse. Some people object to stronger APPs and 
efforts to effect a change on how we interact with non-human animals on the 
grounds that they manifest infringements of people’s freedom. The following 
story is instructive. In one of their manifestoes, the German Green Party recom-
mended the introduction of a Veggie Day during which public canteens in Ger-
many would serve exclusively vegetarian food one day per week (on a voluntary 
                                                             
14  The current argument is also not conceptually committed to a specific view on how animals 
should be seen as a legal category. Unlike status freedom, freedom as an opportunity-
concept is not conceptually committed to a specific legalistic view of ‘free persons’ (or ‘free 
animals’). I take up these issues elsewhere (Schmidt 2015). Also see (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011; Sunstein 2004a, 2004b; Favre 2004; Wise 2004; Francione and Garner 2010; Fran-
cione 2013; Cochrane 2009b) for normative discussions of animal law.  
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basis). Other parties dug up this idea from the Green Party’s manifesto in the run-
up to the federal elections and suggested the Green Party was out to undermine 
personal freedom. Vegetarianism should be a personal choice and enforcing it by 
restricting people’s freedom would be illiberal – or so the argument (Hawley 
2013, see also Ahlhaus and Niesen 2015, ch. 2.1, in this HSR Forum). However, 
if we care not only about human but also animal freedom, then we have a re-
sponse to such objections within the normative framework set out by those mak-
ing them: While stronger APPs might indeed reduce consumer freedom by mak-
ing it more difficult to eat cheap meat at every meal, they might at the same time 
increase animal freedom. The freedom not to live in the torturous conditions of 
today’s factory farms should plausibly be considered a more significant freedom 
than the freedom to consume cheap meat at every meal. Contrary to the assertions 
put forth by the main political parties in Germany then, rather than speaking 
against them, caring about freedom in fact calls for much stricter APPs.  
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